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ABSTRACT
The relationship between energy and capital is one of the most important
aspects of modern economic growth. Machines need energy to produce all
the goods we enjoy; energy would be far less useful for humankind in
absence of machines. However, the great majority of the economic
models do not take into account the elasticities of substitution (or
complementaries) between these two main variables. Actually, energy is
absent in many growth models and discussions on diverging economic
development paths. We approach this relevant issue from a new
perspective: energy and capital relations during 100 years. We use the
latest estimations of capital stock (machinery and equipment) and
energy consumption for Latin America and compare them with those of
Western Europe. The energy–capital ratio (how much energy is used per
unit of capital) could be a predictor of economic growth, thus providing
stylised facts about the timing and causes of the diﬀerent modernisation
patterns of these regions and showing us some answers on the long-run
relationship between energy consumption and capital accumulation.
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1. Introduction
Economic growth models, building on Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1956), tend to stress the
importance of human and physical capital accumulation (Leimbach, Kriegler, Roming, & Schwanitz,
2017; Mankiw, Romer, &Weil, 1992). While there are limits to what extent labour can grow, capital-
deepening (i.e. increasing capital per worker) makes enhanced growth possible. Energy is a crucial
input for both labour and capital. Both labour and capital can convert energy into useful work.
But the ceiling for the energy employed directly by labour is the food that can be consumed by each worker.
Capital has no such ceiling, or only that imposed by current technology. Thus, in the nineteenth century, capi-
tal-deepening production tended to mean energy-deepening production too. (Kander, Malanima, & Warde,
2013, p. 220)
With initial industrialisation, energy-deepening (especially of modern energy carriers) is to be
expected, however as argued by Kander et al. (2013, pp. 219–221) and Allen (2012), capital-deepen-
ing was the most important driver for increasing outputs.1 In this paper, we focus on the interrelation
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://
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1Following the deﬁnition in Gales et al. (2007), we deﬁne as traditional energy carriers ﬁrewood, food for the population and fodder
for draught animals, direct working water, wind and peat and as modern energy carriers coal, oil, natural gas and primary elec-
tricity (hydroelectricity and nuclear).
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between energy and capital and examine the divergent histories of Western Europe and Latin Amer-
ica. We cover the period 1875–1970 and argue, supporting our ideas in recent energy history
research by Csereklyei, Rubio-Varas, and Stern (2016) and Kander et al. (2013), that the rapid
decrease in energy–capital ratios in Europe both growth rates and levels, as compared with Latin
America, can help to understand their economic divergence.
Latin American countries began their independence with vast endowments of land and natural
resources, and were for a while, more prosperous than some European nations. Nevertheless, over
the course of the nineteenth and twentieth century, Latin America did not manage to maintain its
position and a divergence between Europe and Latin America emerged (Bértola & Ocampo,
2012). Measures of GDP per capita have shown the increasing divergence in output per capita
between Latin America and Western Europe (see Table 1).
There have been several studies to measure and explain these diﬀerences2 Both physical capital
stocks (Tafunell & Ducoing, 2016) and energy consumption (Rubio, Yáñez, Folchi, & Carreras,
2010; Yáñez, Rubio, Jofré, & Carreras, 2013) have been used as proxies for economic development,
and as explanations for the divergence. In this article, we look at the ratio between energy and capital.
We observe noticeable diﬀerences among the countries. By-and-large, we see a rapid decrease in
energy–capital ratios in most (Western) European countries in the twentieth century. For Latin
America, the ﬁndings are more complex: Mexico resembles the European countries, albeit with
some delay, for the other Latin American countries no clear downward trends can be discerned
in the twentieth century. We tentatively argue that this may help to explain diﬀerences in economic
development, as a declining energy–capital ratio signals technological advancement and eﬃciency
increase (i.e. less energy is required to produce economic output). Above all, we claim that catch-
up by developing countries without improvements in energy eﬃciency is worrisome. The paper iso-
rganised as follows. In Section 2, we explain the theory behind the relation between energy and capi-
tal; in Section 3, the data used in this research are made explicit; Section 4 presents the results of the
comparison and Section 5 concludes.
2. Energy–capital ratios as indicator of economic development
The modern energy/capital stock in machinery ratio (hereafter, Em/Km&e ratio) as an indicator of
economic development, it is important to ﬁrst address the roles of both energy consumption and
capital accumulation separately. The relationship between energy and economic development is
complex. Csereklyei et al. (2016) ﬁnd, not surprisingly, that energy use per capita increased over
Table 1. GDP per capita (in $GK 1990) in several years.
1875 1913 1929 1950 1970
Belgium 2.861 4.220 5.054 5.462 10.611
France 1.876 3.485 4.710 5.186 11.410
Germany 1.839 3.648 4.051 3.881 10.839
Italy 1.542 2.564 3.093 3.502 9.719
Netherlands 2.755 4.049 5.689 5.996 11.967
Portugal 975 1.250 1.610 2.086 5.473
Spain 1.207 2.056 2.739 2.189 6.319
Sweden 1.345 3.073 4.145 6.769 13.011
UK 3.190 4.921 5.503 6.939 10.767
Argentina 1.417 4.038 4.610 5.276 7.730
Brazil 691 694 968 1.559 2.871
Chile 1.233 2.836 3.279 3.741 5.120
Mexico 623 1.528 1.602 2.308 4.382
Uruguay 1.833 2.694 4.273 4.873 5.124
Source: Bolt & Van Zanden, (2014) for Europe and Bértola and Ocampo (2012) for Latin America
2See, for example, Bulmer-Thomas (2003) and Maddison (2007).
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time as incomes grew; even though there might be some ‘decoupling’ in developed countries in
recent years and the energy intensity (E/GDP) of European countries declined over the last two cen-
turies (when traditional energy sources are included) (Gales, Kander, Malanima, & Rubio, 2007;
Kander et al., 2013). The Industrial Revolution is often linked with the increasing usage of energy
(in particular coal), but whether coal consumption sparked the Industrial Revolution, or whether
it was mainly a consequence of economic development is still subject of debate (Allen, 2009, Chapter
1; McCloskey, 2010, Chapter 22). Moreover, the question of causality between energy consumption
and economic development is still contested (Liddle & Lung, 2015; Payne, 2010). According to
Kander et al. (2013)
energy consumption, and the availability of coal, helped propel economic growth (as did other things). Con-
sumption of coal seems to have been a key part of economic success (…) and cheap energy was a necessary
condition of the industrial revolution. (p. 209)
They argue nevertheless that capital-deepening was the most important driver for increasing
outputs.
In a Cobb-Douglas production function where output is a function of labour and capital, there are
limits to the extent in which labour can grow, capital-deepening makes enhanced growth possible.
De Long and Summers (1991), for instance, have argued that there is a strong causal relationship
between investments in equipment and economic growth3 However, for machinery and equipment
to produce output and economic growth, input of energy is required.
Nonetheless, over the long run, the ratio between capital stock and energy consumption changed
notably. Kander et al. (2013, p. 338) present trends for Sweden, Spain and Britain and conclude that
in all three of these countries the energy to capital ratio decreased notably4 The extent to which this
ratio changed is not the same in all countries and depends a lot on the initial levels of both capital
stock and energy consumption, but an overall trend towards relatively less energy input per unit of
capital is clear. As the energy capital ratio informs us about the amount of energy needed per unit of
capital, a decreasing trend signals energy eﬃciency improvements.
Energy is a crucial input for economic growth through its direct relationship with the productivity
of both labour and machinery; without energy no production hence no economic development.
However, thermal eﬃciency of machinery and equipment has increased over the years (Ayres &
Warr, 2009) and also the economic eﬃciency of energy conversion has increased (at least in the
West) (Gales et al., 2007; Kander et al., 2013). This means relatively, less energy is needed to produce
the same output. Kander et al. (2013, Appendix A) present a growth accounting model which incor-
porates energy.5 They show how energy quantity, quality and augmentation (i.e. energy saving biased
technological change) contribute to economic growth. Stern and Kander (2012) ﬁnd that especially
during the Industrial Revolution expansion of energy services was a major factor in explaining econ-
omic growth (for the case of Sweden), but later capital and labour-augmenting technological change
becomes the dominant factor.
In other words, when energy is scarce it can be a constraint on economic growth (i.e. the pre-IR
‘Malthusian’ steady state), but once energy is relatively abundant (i.e. make up a smaller cost-share)
capital becomes increasingly more important (Stern & Kander, 2012). This, it could be argued, is in
line with the at ﬁrst sight, controversial ﬁnding of Bretschger (2015) that increasing energy prices are
beneﬁcial to economic growth. Bretschger argues, based on a data set which starts in 1975, that
increasing energy prices spur innovation, and that these additional investments foster long-run
economic growth. With the emergence of industrialisation, the consumption of (modern) energy
3.In their 1993 extension of the 1991 paper, they conﬁrm this relationship especially for developing countries (De Long & Summers,
1993). In this same line, is worth to mention the article by Delong (1992), about the relationship between equipment investment
and productivity in the long run.
4Notice that Kander et al. speak of the capital to energy ratio (K/E), hence they speak of increases in the K/E ratio, rather than its
reverse.
5Based on Stern and Kander (2012).
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sources may be expected to rise, but investments in new, modern, more energy-eﬃcient machinery
and equipment will be crucial for long-term economic development. As the energy–capital ratio cap-
tures the consumption of energy relative to the accumulation of capital a decreasing energy–capital
ratio signals economic progress through investment in higher quality capital. This claim ﬁnds sup-
port in existing data for the more recent period: countries with lower energy–capital ratios tend to be
richer than countries with a high energy–capital ratio (see Figure 1).
This graph does not show trends over time, but it does suggest a correlation between the energy–
capital ratio of a country and its economic performance: lower E /K ratios by and large correspond
with higher per capita income (the observations in the top-right of the graph mainly correspond with
oil producers). Csereklyei et al. (2016) cover the period 1971–2010 and ﬁnd that, at least for rich
countries, E /K ratios declined, in line with the ﬁndings by Kander et al. (2013). Interestingly though,
they found increasing E /K ratios in ‘many developing countries, particularly in Africa and in Latin
America’ (Csereklyei et al., 2016).
As we believe decreasing E /K ratios signal economic development through eﬃciency increases, the
reversed trends for these developing countries may be reason for concern. Increasing E /K (at the per-
iphery) in combination with decreasing E /K (at the core) is worrisome. Worrisome in the light of a
production function view with technology as universal blue print. For an increase in E /Kmight signal
development, but not development with the best technique. Furthermore, increasing energy–capital
ratios in developing regions is also a reason for environmental concern. If these developing regions
(Latin America, but also other regions not included in the current study, such as South-East Asia
and China) realise catch-up growth only based on capital-deepening without improving their energy
eﬃciency, their economic development will be unnecessarily energy intensive and thus emission-
intensive. Figure 2 also opens up the question: Is this divergence between, in our case, Europe and
Latin America a structural, long-term, phenomena? In order to ﬁgure out a compelling answer, we
only focus on the period up to 1970, because as Kander et al. (2013) stress, the emergence of less
Figure 1. Energy/capital vs. GDP per capita. 99 countries over the period 1971–2010. Sources: Capital Stock Groningen Growth and
Development Center. FebPwt – penn world table – international comparisons of production, income and prices (8.0); GDP per
capita The Maddison-Project, Maddison update 2013. Accessed May 19th and Energy Consumption (Csereklyei et al., 2016).
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energy-intensive information and communication technologies (since the 1970s) caused a break in the
trends towards quicker decreases in the European countries they compared.6
3. Data
The E /K ratio we have been discussing so far (in the theory and empirical ﬁndings of Kander et al.
(2013), Kander and Schön (2007) and Csereklyei et al. (2016)) applies to all energy consumption
(modern and traditional) and to the entire ﬁxed capital stock (i.e. capital in machinery & equipment,
infrastructure and residential and non-residential constructions). Because of data limitations, it is
impossible to extent both time series back into the nineteenth century though. We therefore have
to work with data on the consumption ofmodern energy carriers, and capital inmachinery and equip-
ment only. This has a number of important implications, aswewill show belowwith the example of the
Netherlands (a country for which we have all data for a long period), but before discussing these, we
ﬁrst introduce the data sources we use. Beyond the data limitations, the use ofmodern energy carrier is
intrinsically linked with the existence of machinery and equipment to produce and transport goods.
3.1. Energy data
Data availability, especially from the side of the Latin American countries, compel us to restrict our
analysis to the use of modern energy carriers (i.e. fossils and modern renewable such as hydroelec-
tricity). An obvious downside of this restriction is that, especially in the nineteenth century, tra-
ditional organic energy sources still made up substantial shares of the total energy consumption
for many of our sample countries. The ﬁrst consequence of this limitation is that the total energy
consumption of a country will be underestimated and the further we go back in time, the more
this will be the case. Since the share of modern energy sources in the total energy mix increases
over the time, the second consequence is that the growth of energy consumption may appear larger
than it actually was. Gales et al. (2007) have shown the importance of including traditional sources of
energy to get a proper view on the historical trajectory of energy intensity. When only modern
energy sources are included, the energy intensity of European countries shows an inverted
U-shape, when also traditional energy sources are included, most countries show constantly decreas-
ing energy intensities7 As the example of the Netherlands will also make clear, when a country is in
transition from traditional to modern energy sources, it may appear as if the energy consumption of
the country is increasing rapidly, while in fact the increase is more gradual because of the substi-
tution of modern energy carriers for traditional sources.
We sampled our energy consumption data from a number of sources. Firstly, we take the data on
energy consumption in Latin America from Rubio et al. (2010) and Yáñez et al. (2013). For a number
of European countries, country-speciﬁc energy consumption series have been published: Italy
(Malanima, 2006), Netherlands (Gales et al., 2007), Portugal (Henriques, 2011) Spain (Rubio,
2005)8, Sweden (Kander, 2002) and the UK (Warde, 2007); for the additional European countries
(Belgium, France and Germany) we use unpublished data collected by Ben Gales (see Table 2).
Figure 2 presents the consumption of modern energy (i.e. fossil fuels, hydroelectricity, nuclear
energy and modern renewables) in the respective countries per capita. Both total energy consump-
tion as well as energy consumption per capita grew for all countries up until the energy crises of the
1970s. With the exception of Spain and Portugal, the European countries overall used many times
more energy per capita than the Latin American countries in our sample. Chile and Uruguay stand
out as Latin American countries with relatively high energy consumption per capita in the late
6Warr and Ayres (2012) found that, before the rise of ICT, exergy can largely explain the Solow-residual . After the 1970s exergy is no
longer the sole explanation for TFP, the ICT-revolution turned information in a major factor increasing total factor productivity.
7See also Kander et al. (2013, Figures 10.11 & 10.12); the only noteworthy exceptions are the UK and Germany at the height of their
industrialisation.
8We use the most recent and revised data (Gales et al., 2007).
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nineteenth century; however, whereas the energy consumption in most countries increased through-
out the twentieth century, energy consumption per capita stagnated in these countries in the mid-
twentieth century.9
3.2. Capital stock in machinery and equipment
Several scholars have done research on capital stock formation to provide estimates for Europe (e.g.
Maddison, 1994). For Latin America, the main research has been elaborated by Hofman (2000) and
Tafunell and Ducoing (2016). For data on capital stock, we run into comparable data limitations we
also faced for energy. Also here, especially the Latin American data compel us to restrict ourselves to
one part of the capital stock: machinery and equipment. This also has some serious implications for
our analysis. First of all, the heating (or potentially cooling) of buildings requires energy as well
which we cannot take into account in the current analysis. Second, machinery tends to increase
more than other capital (Kander et al., 2013, p. 30). This means that, when dividing energy consump-
tion by capital in machinery and equipment, the changes over time will be more pronounced than
the ﬁndings of Kander et al., who divided energy consumption by total capital stock.
The study of the capital stock in the developed world has been a recurrent research topic. The
seminal works of Goldsmith (1951), Kuznets (1961) and Feinstein (1972, p. 8) have provided a refer-
ence for subsequent studies conducted on many industrialised countries. The most common way to
estimate the capital stock is the Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) which consists of the weighted
sum of past investment ﬂows. The gross stock is calculated by adding the cumulative year-to-assets
and subtracting totally worn (withdrawals).
To calculate the gross stock in year t, we follow Feinstein (1988).
(1) GFCSt−1 + GFCFt − Rtr = GFCSt
Where GFCSt−1 is the stock of year t−1, GFCFt is ﬁxed capital formation in the current year (t)
and Rtr are capital withdrawals produced in the current year. The net stock is obtained by subtract-
ing the gross stock depreciation, which is expressed in mathematical terms as follows:
(2) NFCSt−1 + GFCFt − d− d(Rtr) = NFCSt
Table 2. Energy consumption (in TJ) per 1000 inhabitants.
1875a 1913 1929 1950 1970
Belgium 59.88 99.76 135.94 102.71 189.1
France 18.59 45.04 65.10 57.07 123.9
Germany 27.12 90.11 105.07 61.83 131.5
Italy 1.29 9.87 13.55 13.96 86.9
Netherlands 15.91 53.11 59.17 55.95 134.1
Portugal 1.32 6.32 5.64 7.33 22.1
Spain 2.35 25.13 27.01 26.63 46.2
Sweden 5.43 30.73 34.74 52.38 139.2
UK 92.70 122.84 119.11 118.40 160.0
Argentina 0.69 14.64 18.40 23.79 48.1
Brazil 0.96 2.89 2.79 5.02 12.5
Chile 7.30 25.53 19.80 19.17 31.4
Mexico 0.06 3.41 5.99 13.60 29.1
Uruguay 7.37 21.42 13.39 16.13 26.1
aSource: Energy (Gales et al., 2007; Rubio et al., 2010) and population (Bértola & Ocampo, 2012; Bolt & Van Zanden, 2014).
9The UK shows a similar trend in per capita consumption, as Britain was the workshop of the world in the late nineteenth century,
this is less remarkable.
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Where NFCSt−1 is the net capital stock at the beginning of year t, GFCFt is the gross ﬁxed capital
formation during the year, δ is the depreciation during the period, d(Rtr) are depreciated capital
goods removed during the year t and NFCSt is the net capital stock at the end of period t.
The PIM requires two masses of information: historical series of GFCF at constant prices, for each
type of asset and the capital stock in the initial year (OECD, 2009). The latter can be derived directly
from the ﬁrst mass of information, when you set the initial year in the terminal year of life of the ﬁrst
generation of assets with the greatest longevity. For example, with respect to the nineteenth century, if
we attribute a life of 50 years to non-residential buildings and we have investment series dating back to
1850, the initial year of the aggregate capital stock is 1900. This is precisely the option we have chosen.
The initial year of the capital stock in equipment so became 1875, a consequence of the assumption
that, the life of these assets was 25 years during this period. Maddison published historical series of
productive capital accumulation (non-residential capital ) for six developed economies: Germany,
France, UK, Japan, USA and the Netherlands (Maddison, 1994). We used data of Germany, France
and UK; for the Netherlands new estimates have become available since 1994. We replicated Maddi-
son’smethodology for the other the countries. The data sources for the other European countries were
theNetherlands (Albers, 1998; Groote, Albers, &De Jong, 1996), Sweden (Schön&Krantz, 2012), Bel-
gium (Van Meerten, 2003), Italy (Toniolo, 2013), Portugal (Gomes da Silva & Lains, 2013) and Spain
(Prados de La Escosura & Rosés, 2010). Tafunell and Ducoing (2016) calculated estimates of capital
stocks for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. There are series available in Tafunell (2009); Tafunell
and Ducoing (2016) allowing to expand the estimates to other Latin American countries.10 We used
the same methodology as in Tafunell and Ducoing (2016).
We can observe huge diﬀerences in capital stock in machinery & equipment, both within the
regions and across them, especially at the end of the period (see Table 3). Up until the 1950s, the
Latin American countries, and most notably Uruguay, can keep up with the European countries.
Between 1950 and 1973, the European countries increased their capital stock roughly by a factor
of 3–5; the only Latin American country that comes close to this is Mexico. However, if we observe
the long run, this situation was diﬀerent before the First World War. Chile, for example, had US$ G-
K 504 in machinery per 1000 inhabitants in 1913 and Sweden has just 1.5 times more. If we jump to
1970, this diﬀerence has changed to a ratio of 17 (to Sweden).
3.3. Implications of our data choice: the example of the Netherlands
As mentioned above, the usage of modern energy sources rather than total energy consumption and
the usage of capital stocks in machinery and equipment rather than total capital stocks has a number
Table 3. Capital stock in machinery & equipment per 1000 inhabitants.
1875 1913 1929 1950 1970
Belgium 2144a 2328 2883 6036
Germany 739b 1063 1028 1222 5335
Italy 391 1306 702 1757 5643
Netherlands 611 1685 2416 2216 7742
Portugal 24 43 161 779
Spain 214c 356 650 682 3052
Sweden 215 751 1188 4.309 12311
UK 403 858 1416 2.132 5642
Argentina 19 364 371 639 1614
Brazil 96 681 602 571 747
Chile 61 504 626 479 725
Mexico 13 180 237 553 1948
Uruguay 356d 1044 1073 2245 2293
aData for 1914.bData for 1935.cData for 1890.dData for 1884.
10For an analytical description of the long-term evolution of Gross Fix Capital Formation in Latin America, see Tafunell (2013). Series
from Uruguay were contrasted with the work done by Román and Willebald (2015).
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of consequences that limit the comparability of our analysis with the ﬁndings of Kander et al. (2013)
and Csereklyei et al. (2016). Therefore, before presenting the results of our analysis, we ﬁrst work out
the case of the Netherlands by way of example. For the Netherlands, we have long-term time series
on all relevant variables: modern energy consumption, total energy consumption, total ﬁxed capital
stock (K ), and capital in machinery and equipment. Even though machinery and equipment were,
especially in the earlier stages of industrialisation, the most important aspect of capital-deepening
(Kander et al., 2013), it is only a subset of all capital. Other forms of capital require energy as
well, for example for heating or cooling of houses and oﬃce buildings. Unfortunately, we cannot
divide energy consumption among these diﬀerent forms of capital for lack of disaggregated data.
Figure 3 shows what happens when we use modern energy sources only, and what the result is of
the use of machinery and equipment rather than total capital stocks.
As Figure 3 shows, if we look at the ratio between total energy consumption and all capital, we see
an overall decrease over this period, although it is less pronounced as than ﬁndings for Spain, UK
and especially Sweden by Kander and Schön (2007). There are two important reasons for this.
First of all, the Netherlands started with relatively high levels of capital. Second, the Netherlands
transformed into a rather energy-intensive country during the 1960s; therefore, the E /K ratio
increases again at the end of our period (after the 1970s it also decreased again).11 During most
of the nineteenth and twentieth century, attempts to economise on fuel were the norm though
(Ayres, Ayres, & Warr, 2003). This can also be seen from the ever-decreasing energy intensity levels
documented by Gales et al. (2007). They found that according to their new series, ‘energy intensity
tends to decrease, except during the 1950s and 1960s: a period of fast economic growth and very low
energy prices’ (Gales et al., 2007, p. 236). However, overall, the decrease is noticeable.
If we, instead, limit the capital stockwe take into account tomachinery and equipment, the decreas-
ing trend becomes a lotmore visible. Themain reason for this is that in themid-nineteenth century, the
Netherlands was still relatively non-industrialised, and the accumulation of capital in the form of
machinery and equipment went a lot quicker than the accumulation of other forms of capital. By look-
ing only at machinery and equipment, we therefore capture investments in this more productive form
of capital, and seemore clearly an increase of eﬃciency. Since we do not know exactly howmuch of the
Figure 3. Energy–capital relations in the Netherlands, 1850–1970 (1900=1). Sources: Energy data: (Gales et al., 2007); Capital data:
(Albers, 1998) and (Groote et al., 1996).
11The post-Second World War boom in energy consumption was a historical anomaly. During this period, characterised by Pﬁster
with the 1950s syndrome, energy seemed to be available in unprecedented and unlimited supply (Pﬁster, 2010).
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energy was exactly used to power thesemachines, and howmuch was used for other purposes (such as
heating), this decrease may well exaggerate the eﬃciency improvements though.
Besides using a subset of all capital, we also use a subset of all energy consumed, namely modern
energy only (Em). Let us ﬁrst see what the eﬀects are of considering only modern energy sources (in
this case excluding peat), but all accumulated capital (Em/K ). Now, we no longer see a declining
trend, but rather a weak U-shape. Since the share of modern energy carriers in the entire energy sys-
tem increased rapidly in the nineteenth century, this is not surprising. As in the twentieth century,
and especially after the SecondWorldWar, virtually all energy was derived frommodern sources, the
E /K ratio and the Em/K ratio are essentially the same (because 1900 is set to 1 the deviations in the
Em/K appear somewhat more pronounced, the decreasing path is entered much later because of the
substitution of modern energy for traditional sources that was still taking place before the Second
World War).
Finally, we arrive at the energy–capital ratio we are using in this paper: modern energy over capi-
tal in machinery and equipment (Em/Km&e ). Here, we see the increasing trend caused by the tran-
sition to modern energy sources in the nineteenth century, but then a decrease during the twentieth
century. We see that after the Second World War, energy consumption increased rapidly, while the
accumulation of capital in machinery and equipment initially remained slightly behind, but the
downward trend is quickly continued until the 1960s when the discovery of domestic natural gast
boosted energy consumption.12
What does this exercise tell us about the comparability of our indicator with the indicators used
by Kander et al. (2013) and Csereklyei et al. (2016)? And what does it mean for the international
comparison in the remainder of this paper? Firstly, we have to observe that focusing on machinery
and equipment means that we may expect a more pronounced decreasing trend because the accumu-
lation of machinery and equipment speeds up with economic development and goes quicker than the
accumulation of other forms of capital (i.e. industrialisation, see Kander et al., 2013). Secondly, the
exclusion of traditional energy means though that we might expect an inverted U-shape, especially in
countries where the transition to modern energy carriers developed relatively late, and was still going
on in the twentieth century. Nonetheless, over the long run, more industrialised/developed countries
will still present a decrease in the E /K ratio in the more modern period. We may therefore expect
that our ﬁndings for Em/Km&e, even though they might exhibit an increase in the earlier period,
should show eﬃciency improvements through eventual decreases.
4. Results
4.1. UK index
We have constructed an index (UK 1890=100) to understand the trends of the several countries of
our study. This index allowed to calculate standardised growth rates over the total period and over
several sub-periods. Figures 4 and 5 give a graphical representation of the index between 1875 and
1975. One of the interesting results of this exercise, is to appreciate the diﬀerences between Europe
and Latin America in the long run. We can classify regions. Taking growth over the full period, three
groups emerge. The decreasing growth rates group, the stable growth rates group and the increasing
growth rates group. The ﬁrst group comprises Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK, Chile and Uruguay;
the second group includes Argentina and Germany; and the last one consists of Italy, Mexico and
Brazil. These results do change if other periods are chosen. Table 4 speciﬁes several ones. The
most dramatic change occurs when the year 1930 is used as starting point.
Figures 4 and 5 and Table 5 show the Em/Km&e ratios for the European and Latin American
countries, respectively. We see that the rate of the decline (i.e. the steepness of the curves) may
diﬀer substantially; this is related to both the initial levels of capital and the energy intensity
12Figure 3 represents the Modern Energy/Machinery & Equipment ratio in a longer period.
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Figure 4. Energy–capital ratios in Europe, 1875–1970 (UK 1890=100).
Figure 5. Energy–capital ratios in Latin America, 1875–1970 (UK 1890=100).
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(E /GDP) of the economies. There is a clear diﬀerence in the trends though. While most European
countries show decreasing Em/Km&e ratios in the twentieth century, the Latin American countries
exhibit more mixed results.
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Spain show an initial increase in their respective Em/
Km&e ratios in the end of the nineteenth century. Given that these countries were relatively late indus-
trialisers within Europe whose energy system switched to coal later, this is exactly what we would
expect. However, just as the UK, which had made a more complete transition to modern energy car-
riers much earlier, and Portugal, for which our data start a bit later, they all witnessed a decrease in the
energy–capital ratio, and thus signal eﬃciency improvements, throughout the twentieth century.
Belgium is somewhat more tricky. We see the decreasing Em/Km&e we would expect since the
late 1920s. From the First World War until the late 1920s, the Em/Km&e ratio increased sharply
though, however, as Belgium was heavily aﬀected by the war, this explains largely the anomaly.
For France, the available capital datalimit our analysis to a too short period to derive any hard con-
clusions, but the downward trends we do see for the years available seem to be in line with the other
European countries in our sample. The only European outlier is Italy.
In Italy, the transition to modern energy sources happened remarkably slowly. The share of tra-
ditional energy dropped just below 50% only just before the Second World War, while over the
period 1914–1945, the growth rate of modern energy consumption was actually negative (Bartoletto,
2013). This explains the decreasing Em/Km&e in the interwar period. After the Second World War,
until the oil crisis of 1973, modern energy consumption (of especially oil) in Italy showed an growth
Table 4. Growth rates modern energy/capital in M&E.
1875–1970 1890–1970 1900–1970 1930–1970 1950–1970
Belgium −0.5 %a −0.8% −11.7%
France −4.8% −4.8%
Germany −0.6%b −1.6% −3.4% −4.0%
Italy 0.9% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3% 2.8%
Netherlands −7.0% −7% −0.5% −0.5% −2.7%
Portugal −3.7%a −3.7% −2.8%
Spain −1.0% −1.0% −1.0% −1.3% −2.7%
Sweden −1.7% −2.3% −2.4% −2.68% −0.8%
UK −2.4% −2,6% −2.6% −2.4% −3.9%
Argentina −0.4% −0.4% −0.5% −1.6% −1.6%
Brazil 1.0% 1.8% 2.0% 3.4% 3.9%
Chile −1.2% −0.4% −0.1% 0.4% 0.9%
Mexico 1.2% −0.5% −1.6% −2.0% −4.1%
Uruguay −1.6% −1.6% 0.8% 0.2% 2.4%
a1914–1970.
b1880–1970.
Table 5. Energy/capital stock in M&E ratio (TJ per thousands M&E units).
1875 1913 1929 1950 1970
Belgium 29.1a 58.4 35.6 31.3
France 53.1 24.7
Germany 44.10 84.75 102.23 50.6 24.6
Italy 5.4 7.6 19.3 7.9 15.4
Netherlands 26.1 25.6 24.5 25.2 17.3
Portugal 265.9 132.1 45.5 28.4
Spain 70.6 41.5 39.1 15.1
Sweden 25.2 39.9 29.2 12.2 11.3
UK 230.2 143.2 84.1 55.5 28.4
Argentina 36.7 40.2 49.6 37.2 29.8
Brazil 10 4.3 4.6 8.8 16.7
Chile 120.5 50.6 31.7 40 43.3
Mexico 4.4 18.9 25.3 24.6 14.9
Uruguay 28.9c 20.5 12.5 7.2 11.4
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rate of 17% per year (Bartoletto, 2013). Given this impressive rate of energy-deepening and the late
transition to modern energy sources, the increasing Em/Km&e ratio after the SecondWorldWar can
be explained, but Italy is a marked anomaly within the European countries.
The Latin American countries display very mixed results. Argentina does show signs of eﬃciency
improvements. The very high energy–capital ratio of Chile in the late nineteenth century, on par, as the
only country in our sample besides Portugal, with the UK, stands out, but can be explained by the very
energy-intensive production of Saltpeter which took place there in the second half of the nineteenth
century (Badia-Miró & Ducoing, 2015). Nevertheless around the turn of the century impressive capi-
tal-deepening also took hold. During the twentieth century, the Em/Km&e ratio barely improved.
For the case of Mexico, we see roughly an inverted U-shape in the way we have also seen it for the
late industrialisers in Europe. Mexico only peaked a few years later than the European countries,
indicating a later uptake of modern energy carriers. Mexico was also the only Latin American
country in our sample where import substitution industrialisation did not take place in the same
form than the rest of countries. Although the country was behind, it did develop its own machinery
and exhibits comparable eﬃciency improvements.
The very high energy–capital ratio of Chile in the late nineteenth century, on par, with the UK,
stands out, but can be explained by the very energy-intensive production of Saltpeter which took
place there in the second half of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless around the turn of the century,
impressive capital-deepening took hold. During the twentieth century, the Em/Km&e ratio barely
improved.
Brazil showed very low Em/Km&e ratios throughout most of the twentieth century, but they
increased steadily since the First World War, only to accelerate after the Second; its late uptake of
modern energy carriers has made the Brazilian case comparable to Italy. Uruguay, ﬁnally, appears
to demonstrate an inverted U-shape until the 1950s, even though the Em/Km&e ratio thus decreased
for some decades, this decrease did not continue after the Second World War. As we saw in Table 3,
this is mainly the result of a sudden stagnation of the growth of the capital stock.
Overall, we can thus conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Kander et al. (2013) for the (Western) European
countries, but although decreasing E /K ratios have been the norm in the more developed parts of
the world, they ocurred less in the developing region of Latin America. Second, we can also extend
the ﬁndings by Csereklyei et al. (2016) and see that the divergence between Europe and Latin Amer-
ica is not only a result of the Third Industrial Revolution taking place since the 1970s. It is more
structural. This has a number of implications: First, the structural backwardness of Latin America
in terms of its energy eﬃciency hampers its economic development. The lack of eﬃciency improve-
ments signals lack of innovation and a lack of investment in modern (i.e. more energy eﬃcient) capi-
tal that could contribute to economic development. As Latin American countries grew their capital
stock largely by importing second hand machinery and equipment from Europe (Tafunell & Duco-
ing, 2016), opportunities for catch up were also limited because of the constant backwardness in the
eﬃciency of this machinery; as we saw, the only notable exception was Mexico, a country which did
not follow a policy of import substitutionindustrialisation and the only country with a ‘modern’ Em/
Km&e pattern.
We argue that decreasing Em/Km&e ratios are important for economic development, but also
signal economic development as they are also indicative of investment in new, more energy eﬃcient,
capital goods. When an investment in physical capital is made, i.e. the machine or infrastructure has
been put in place, the energy consumption is more or less determined. In such a so-called putty-clay
model, which tends to hold for energy consuming capital, richer countries can be expected to have
invested more in higher quality, more energy-eﬃcient, capital. Hence, a lower energy–capital ratio is
indicative of more economic prosperity, while a decreasing E/K ratio over time is indicative of econ-
omic development. Whereas Western European countries managed to keep investing in new and
better machinery, Latin America stayed behind and did not succeed in keeping up with the devel-
opments in the Western World, and therefore also entered a path of slower growth.
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5. Conclusions
In this paper, we compared the long-term trends in energy–capital ratios of nine Western European
and ﬁve Latin American countries. We found, following up on Kander et al. (2013) and Csereklyei
et al. (2016), that the Em/Km&e ratios in the Western European countries in our sample, overall,
decreased steadily over the course of the twentieth century (Italy being the only exception)13
Latin American countries show more mixed results, and stayed behind in this development. We cov-
ered the period 1875–1970 and argue that the rapid decrease in energy–capital ratios in Europe in the
twentieth century, as compared with Latin America, can (in part) explain the economic divergence
between the two regions. Decreasing Em/Km&e ratios signal investment in modern, more energy
eﬃcient, machinery. These investments can foster economic growth and build the bases for struc-
tural change and development.
Finally, energy eﬃciency improvements are crucial for sustainable growth. Kander et al. (2013,
pp. 339–341) make clear that capital cannot endlessly substitute for energy as a certain level of energy
will always be needed to power machines. Nonetheless, improving eﬃciency is crucial, not only
because output requires less energy, but also because relatively less emissions are produced. Sustain-
able catching up of underdeveloped and developing regions with the developed world implies opting
for an eﬃcient and not detrimental road.
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